A contest is a situation in which individuals expend resources in order to win valuable prize(s). 'Sabotage' is a deliberate, and often costly and illegal, act of damaging a rival's likelihood of winning the contest. It is done by exerting resources to negatively in ‡uence the effectiveness of a rival's e¤orts, or by increasing the rival's cost of e¤ort, or by denying the rival access to resources. Sabotage can be observed in sports, war, promotional tournaments, political or marketing campaigns etc. In this article, we review the economics literature analyzing the act of sabotage in contests. We introduce a general structure and discuss the theories and evidence highlighting why sabotage occurs, the e¤ects of sabotage on individual players and on overall welfare, and possible mechanisms to reduce the act of sabotage. We conclude by pointing out certain areas of future research.
Introduction
Sabotage is ubiquitous in everyday life. The earliest mention of sabotage in an economic setting, to our knowledge, was by Kautilya, the Prime Minister of Chandragupta Maurya (the …rst King of the Maurya Kingdom in ancient India) in 400 BC. Cambridge dictionary de…nes sabotage as 'to damage or destroy equipment, weapons or buildings in order to prevent the success of an enemy or competitor'. In the context of personnel economics, Lazear (1989, p. 563 ) de…nes sabotage as "any (costly) actions that one worker takes that adversely a¤ect the output of another". Although the concept of sabotage is quite familiar, the day to day de…nitions and understandings of the same vary across context, place and time. In the Industrial Organization literature, sabotage is connected with the act of 'raising rival's cost' (Salop and Sche¤man, 1983) . Early literature on labor issues considers sabotage as intentional employment of lower level e¢ ciency by laborers in response to lower wages o¤ered (Pouget, 1912) . 1 In each of these cases, however, individuals employ strategies that are intended to damage someone else's success instead of improving one's own. Sabotage has a similar meaning in contest literature too. A deliberate and costly act by one player to damage the performance of another in a contest is, in general, termed as sabotage.
In the current study, we review the economics literature on sabotage in the perspective of contests.
Contests are situations in which players expend costly resources in order to win valuable prize(s) and irrespective of the outcome, all the resources expended become sunk. Examples of such situations include sports, lobbying, job interviews, promotional tournaments, research funding applications, legal disputes, war, patent races, and advertising -to name a few. In each of these circumstances, players have the opportunity to expend resources to improve their own probability of winning the prize. Often, however, they also have the opportunity to expend resources to reduce the probability of another contestant winning the same prize. Following a major part of the literature, we term the resources expended to increase one's own probability of winning as 'e¤ort', and those expended to reduce rivals' probability of winning as 'sabotage'. Since the overall probability of winning the prize is …xed, sabotage indirectly improves one's likelihood of winning the prize. However, this type of behavior is often out of norm, illegal, and costly -making sabotage an expensive strategy. Despite this, occurrence of such behavior is widespread, as the following examples indicate:
1 In this context, Veblen (1921, pp 38) de…nes sabotage as the "conscientious withdrawal of e¢ ciency."
The steady decline of Microsoft since 2000 under CEO Steve Ballmer is often attributed to the new employee review system introduced by him (Oremus, 2013) . In this system employees are evaluated relative to each other, top performers receive bonuses and promotions, whereas those at the bottom often have to fear for their jobs. The review system encourages employees to do almost everything they can to improve their ranking relative to their peers. For instance, it is reported that people responsible for features will openly sabotage other people's efforts. A subtle way to accomplish this is by withholding information from colleagues to ensure that they do not get ahead on the rankings.
Businesspeople often resort to costly strategies that are employed with the purpose of damaging the competitors' business. Friedman (1998, pp 577) describes such a business malpractice that used to occur in the 1890s. John H. Patterson, the owner of the National Cash Register
Company, placed look-alike copies of the competitors'cash registers in the market. He mentioned that "The intention ... is not to sell it, but only to prevent the sales (of others)". He also …elded a special type of salaried counter-productive salesmen. Salesmen were not required to promote the own product; instead, their job was to follow the salesmen of rival …rms from shop to shop and to convince the customers to cancel any order that had just been placed.
In many marketing campaigns …rms highlight their rival's weak points.
One such example is the famous 2008 campaign by Progresso, which highlighted that its rival Campbell's has 95 soups made with the MSG.
bin, 2011).
This is even more frequent in political campaigns in which the opponents are discredited and often denigrated. In the 1997 general election campaign, the conservative party in the UK used an advertisement with a picture of the then Labor party leader Tony Blair. However, his eyes in the picture were replaced with demonic eyes.
Political imprisonment can be seen as an extreme form of employment of such negative e¤ort in a political contest. As an example, consider
Aung San Suu Kyi who was placed under house arrest in 1990, when her National League for Democracy received 59% of the votes in the Burmese general election.
Scorched earth policy is a famous strategy in warfare and takeover battles. In warfare, it involves troops burning any land/crops/trees as they retreat so there are no supplies to refresh the advancing army. In takeover battles, the strategy describes actions that a …rm undertakes to make the proposed takeover unattractive to the acquiring …rm, such a liquidating its valuable and desired assets and assuming liabilities.
Female Satin bowerbirds view bowers as indicators of male quality in mate choice. As a consequence of this, male satin bowerbirds often destroy the bowers of other males to gain an advantage in sexual competition (Borgia, 1985) .
All these examples, although in very di¤erent contexts, portray essen-tially the same issue. However, since these examples often resemble other seemingly similar behaviors in contests, it is important to distinguish the act of sabotage in contests from behaviors such as 'punishment' (Abbink et al., 2010) , 'cheating' (Preston and Szymanski, 2003) , 'nastiness' (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009 ) and 'risk taking' (Genakos and Pagliero, 2012 there exists no comprehensive survey to cover the existing studies. Partial reviews of sabotage behavior, as parts of larger reviews, were previously provided by Konrad (2009, Chapter 5. 3) on theoretical literature and by Dechenaux et al. (2012, Chapter 6 .1) on experimental literature. In addition, a brief overview on sabotage in rent-seeking contests was recently given by Amegashie (2013) . In this study, we speci…cally review the economics literature of sabotage in contests, both in theoretical and applied sides. We cover the literature involving economic arguments, but do not consider literature from other interest areas, such as organizational behavior or political science although they might be related in terms of broader appeal.
The remainder of this survey is arranged as follows. In the next section, we provide a general speci…cation of contests without sabotage, and then introduce sabotage into this framework. Next, we discuss the consequences and welfare e¤ects of agents engaging in sabotage, for the contest organizer and for third parties. There are mainly two ways to discourage a saboteur, either by reducing the bene…t of sabotage or by increasing the costs of sabotage. We discuss these issues in detail and introduce examples. We conclude by pointing out the possible research contributions that are yet to be made.
Contests without sabotage
From a game-theory perspective, majority of contests are two-stage games.
In the …rst stage, the contest organizer sets the 'rules of the game' such as structure of prizes, number of contestants and so on. 3 The contestants observe these rules and choose their competitive activities in the game's second stage. The early contest literature (e.g., Tullock, 1980 in rent-seeking; Lazear and Rosen, 1981 in tournament; and Baye et al., 1996 in all-pay auction) has assumed that competitive actions are one-dimensional and a¤ect own 'output' or 'performance' in the contest positively. The allocation of prizes among contestants depends upon all the contestants' performances and, hence, on the contestants' actions. Typically, a better performance makes a contestant more likely to receive a higher prize.
To formalize these arguments, suppose there are N risk-neutral contestants indexed by i 2 f1; :::; N g. Each contestant chooses an action or 'e¤ort'e i . To simplify the exposition, we follow the path of most theoretical contest papers. We assume that there is a single winner prize that is valued w 1i by contestant i, and N 1 identical (and lower valued) loser prizes that are valued w 2i by contestant i. We de…ne the prize spread as w i := w 1i w 2i .
Contestant i receives the winner prize with probability p i = p i (e), where e = (e 1 ; :::; e N ) denotes the vector of e¤orts. p i , often termed as a 'contest success function'in the literature, is non-decreasing in e i , and non-increasing in e i = (e 1 ; :::; e i 1 ; e i+1 ; :::; e N ). Contestant i chooses his action in order to maximize his expected payo¤
with c i (e i ) as the cost of his action. A higher action is assumed to lead to higher cost, thus c 0 i > 0.
government license, for instance, the winner prize is the pro…t that the parties can earn on being awarded the license. In both these situations, the game consists of only one (namely, the second) stage.
In major part of the applications, it is assumed that there is no betweencontestant asymmetry in prize valuations, i.e., w 1i = w 1 8i and w 2i = w 2 8i;
and, as a result, w i = w. For most part of the continuation, we will assume the same, making notes in case of exceptions.
From (1), it is easy to see that a contestant faces a simple trade-o¤ when deciding about his optimal e¤ort. By employing a higher level of e¤ort, he can increase his probability of receiving the winner prize. However, he also increases the cost entailed by the e¤ort. The optimal e¤ort depends on the contest design chosen in the …rst stage. The prize spread, for example, a¤ects a contestant's gain from outperforming his rivals and thus his optimal e¤ort. In many applications, it is assumed that the organizer receives some payo¤, which depends on the vector of e¤orts, while he has to pay the contest prizes. So he may wish to design the contest in a way such as to maximize the di¤erence between the payo¤ and the sum of contest prizes.
Rationale behind sabotage in contests
As indicated before, the allocation of prizes in contests typically depends on the contestants'relative performances. Therefore, the probability of receiving the winner prize could be increased either by increasing the own performance (e.g. by choosing higher e¤ort as argued in the preceding sec- Dye (1984) and Lazear (1989) were the …rst economists to account for such destructive behavior in contests. They have denoted the actions s ij (j = 1; :::; N , j 6 = i) as sabotage. Again, it is typically assumed that peforming these actions is costly. Among other components, these costs may contain a punishment for detected sabotage, cost to hide sabotage acts, and e¤ort expended in implementing sabotage.
So the total costs now amount to c i = c i (e i ; s i ).
5 Taking these arguments into account, the payo¤ function in (1), speci…ed in the preceding section, changes to
While deciding upon his sabotage activities, a player faces a similar tradeo¤ as the one described for productive e¤orts. By sabotaging his opponents, the player may increase not only his probability of winning, but also the cost entailed by his sabotage activities. Therefore, the theoretical prediction is that players may well …nd it in their interest to sabotage others. 6 Whether 4 This speci…cation excludes the term s ii , i.e., the possibility of sabotaging oneself.
Although 'self sabotage'may seem improbable, show that it is rational for a player in some special circumstances to sabotage himself. We discuss this issue again in Section 4.1. 5 An exception is the paper by Beviá and Corchón (2006) . They assume that players share the aggregate output they produce and that their shares depend on the relative contributions to total output. By sabotaging the other players, a player increases his relative contribution, while at the same time total output decreases. Hence, there is an indirect rather than a direct cost of sabotage. 6 In addition, it is easy to see that contestants are more inclined to sabotage others if players behave in line with this prediction can only be answered by looking at the data on behavior in contests. Unfortunately, sabotage activities are rarely recorded so that …eld studies on sabotage are basically absent. An early exception is the paper by Drago and Garvey (1998) . They conduct a survey of Australian employees and …nd that employees tend to help each other less if their compensation depends on relative performance. As sabotage can be understood as the opposite of help (because sabotage decreases another player's performance, whereas help increases it), their …ndings imply that sabotage is empirically relevant. This conclusion is con…rmed by numerous laboratory experiments (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2004 , 2008 Harbring et al., 2007; Falk et al., 2008; Vandegrift and Yavas, 2010; Carpenter et al., 2010; and Gürtler et al., 2011) , and …eld studies from sports (Balafoutas et al., 2012; Brown and Chowdhury, 2013; and Deutscher et al., 2013 ) that have been conducted to investigate sabotage in contests.
Welfare e¤ects of sabotage
The examples stated in the Introduction o¤er anecdotal evidences of sabotage, and the studies cited in the previous section establish that sabotage is empirically relevant as well. These beg for investigating the welfare e¤ects of sabotage. The act of sabotage has several consequences; but in general, it results in a¤ecting the welfare adversely. It is easy to observe that the resources expended on sabotage behavior are unproductive and hence wasteful. the probability of winning the prize is very sensitive to sabotage e¤orts. We revisit this issue when we discuss policies to restrict sabotage in Section 5. 
Victims of sabotage and related consequences
Many studies on sabotage in contests either consider situations with two contestants or focus on symmetric equilibria, in which all players are subject to the same amount of sabotage. However, if a player faces at least two opponents, he may decide to decrease one player's output more strongly than another one's. In those circumstances, the obvious question that arises is: Which player is subject to most sabotage?
One obvious aspect of this question is the possibility of heterogeneity among contestants. A contestant would be indi¤erent to sabotaging di¤erent rivals if they are homogenous. Heterogeneity may either have the nature of ex-ante, i.e., contestants may be inherently di¤erent in terms of e¢ ciency, or it may have the nature of ex-post, i.e., in a multi-stage contest, one (ex-ante homogenous) contestant might perform better in the early rounds than his rivals. Ex-ante heterogeneity, under risk neutrality, can be easily captured by heterogeneity in prize values. If w i > w j ; then it can be said that contestant i is more e¢ cient than contestant j.
Determining optimal shooting strategies in truels (shooting contests between three players), Shubik (1954) already indicated that the best shooter may not necessarily survive the truel with the highest probability. This is because the other two players may focus their attention on the best shooter in order to eliminate him early from the contest. A similar logic has been proven to be true in more general kinds of contests. In contests with at least three players, very able players are often sabotaged more strongly because they present the greater danger.
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To capture this argument formally, we put some additional structure on p i . Suppose that each contestant's performance is denoted by y i and suppose that y i is a function of e i and s i . Assume further that contestant i receives the winner prize if and only if his performance is the high-7 See, for instance, Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) , Chen (2003) , Yumoto (2003) , Mün-ster (2007) or Gürtler and Münster (2010) . Regarding the example of the Satin bowerbirds in the introduction, it is observed that the bowers that are arti…cially decorated with exaggerate number of berries are subject to more destruction (Madden, 2001) .
est among all the contestants' performances. Then p i can be restated as p i = P (y i > max fy 1 ; :::; y i 1 ; y i+1 ; :::; y N g), where P ( ) denotes the probability operator. Suppose that contestant i believes that contestant j is so able that he will be the best performer among all of i's opponents or, in other words, that max fy 1 ; :::; y i 1 ; y i+1 ; :::; y N g = y j . Then p i simpli…es to
, and i …nds it optimal to only sabotage contestant j (since @p i (e ;s ) @s ik = 0 for all k = 1; :::; N; k 6 = i; j), if he wants to sabotage anyone at all.
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The consequences for the contest organizer can be disastrous. Talented players may not want to participate in the contest if they anticipate sabotage (Münster 2007) . The contest organizer may thus be stuck with mediocre contestants. This kind of adverse selection is particularly detrimental if the e¤orts exerted by the best players are pivotal in determining social welfare.
Examples of such incidences are patent races or innovation tournaments with spillovers. In those situations, the highest e¤ort is usually related with a better quality product or process, and the act of sabotage may potentially damage the quality.
Another consequence of the threat of sabotage is that, in early rounds of dynamic contests, players may not want to put forth much productive e¤ort in order to avoid gaining a lead and thereby becoming the victim of sabotage in later rounds (Gürtler and Münster, 2010) . obtain an even stronger result. They assume that contestants su¤er psychologically on being sabotaged by others. Consequently, they may decide to help others in the early rounds of a dynamic tournament or even engage in self-sabotage in order to not be targeted by the sabotage e¤orts of others in later rounds. Hence, the problem of sabotage may lead to an additional problem of demotivation. It is to be noted, however, that the results only hold if none of the competitors is beyond the reach of the other competitors before the …nal period begins. Otherwise, the winner of the tournament would be known before the start of the …nal round and sabotaging others would no longer make sense.
These theoretical …ndings are well supported by experimental studies.
Gürtler et al. (2013) conduct experiments on dynamic three-person contests
and …nd that players with a lead at the beginning of the …nal round are sabotaged more strongly than players that are not in a leading position. They also con…rm that the prospect of being sabotaged at a later stage of the game reduces the incentive to work productively early on. A similar observation is made by Carpenter et al. (2010) . In the experiment by Carpenter et al.
(2010), a competitor's performance is subjectively evaluated by his opponents. Players can sabotage other players by underreporting those players' performances. Carpenter et al. (2010) …nd that subjects indeed underreport performances, and this has a negative e¤ect on incentives.
An interesting result is derived by Deutscher et al. (2013) . In a theoretical model, they …nd that the more able contestants are sabotaged more strongly even in static two-player contests. The result depends on the assumption that the more able contestants have a higher return on productive e¤ort, and productive and sabotage e¤orts are substitutes for each other.
Because of the …rst assumption, less able contestants exert lower productive e¤ort, which together with the second assumption implies a higher choice of sabotage. Deutscher et al. test their predictions using data from German professional soccer and obtain results in line with their theoretical …ndings. in a mixed tournament between men and women, women are sabotaged more strongly than men. While men therefore win the tournament with a higher probability, they also incur higher sabotage costs. These two e¤ects more or less even out, so that the expected payo¤s are similar for men and women.
Other welfare e¤ects of sabotage
In the previous subsection, we discussed the e¤ects of sabotage on its victims.
However, just the fear of sabotage may discourage the players from putting forth productive e¤ort. It may also lead to a¤ect third parties adversely. In this subsection, we discuss studies highlighting these consequences. Charness et al. (2013) run a between-subject laboratory experiment to understand the possible e¤ect of sabotage in a situation in which subjects receive a …xed (i.e., performance independent) wage. In di¤erent treatments, the subjects are required to perform a real e¤ort task. In one treatment, they were not
given any feedback about their relative performance, whereas in another treatment, they were informed about the same. In an additional treatment with feedback, they had the opportunity to expend resources to reduce the performance of other participants (and hence improve their relative ranking).
It is found that although there is no incentive to exert any e¤ort, subjects actually expend e¤ort in all treatments. Providing feedback improves performance signi…cantly. However, when the subjects have the opportunity to sabotage each other, the …nal performance becomes signi…cantly lower than the one in the treatment with feedback but no sabotage. This happens for two reasons: …rst, the subjects' …nal outcome is reduced by sabotage, and second, anticipating the same, the subjects exert less e¤ort. This experiment raises a speci…c adverse e¤ect of sabotage, namely that that the bene…t from information disclosure in the form of feedback may be wiped out if sabotage is present.
A¢ rmative actions such as providing handicap or head-start, are often employed in various contests to provide advantages to disadvantaged groups.
In our notation, an a¢ rmative action induces more randomness in the function p i (e; s), thus allowing greater chance for a disadvantaged player to win and thereby inducing him to exert higher e¤ort. 10 However, this may also result in a higher level of sabotage, o¤setting any welfare gain from the a¢ rmative action. Brown and Chowdhury (2013) consider this particular issue in which a contest designer utilizes policy tools in order to level the playing …eld for the contestants. They use data from the British Horse Racing Association in 2010. In a standard horse race, every horse is required to carry a 10 It is observed in sports such as Golf (Brown, 2011 ) that a di¤erence in e¢ ciency might discourage low e¢ ciency players so that the overall e¤ort exerted in the contest may be low. To overcome this issue, contest designers often handicap the e¢ cient players or give head-starts to the players with lower e¢ ciency. minimum amount of weight. In the case of handicap races that are designed to make the race more 'even' among the contestants, higher ranked horses carry more weights than other horses. The authors show that the handicap works in the right direction, in the sense that it reduces the likelihood of the highest ranked horse to win. They then include the concept of sabotage in horse racing. Often a jockey intentionally bumps into another horse, makes rail in front of other horses, or makes his horse run in a dangerous way to reduce the likelihood of other horses winning. Specifying these incidences as sabotage, the authors …nd that a handicap not only makes the contest even, it also increases the likelihood of sabotage. Brown and Chowdhury (2013) conclude that handicap, head-start or any other a¢ rmative action related policy tools that make the contest even in order to induce more effort, should be used with caution as they can initiate and escalate sabotage behavior.
It is also conceivable that sabotage a¤ects agents involved in the system who do not actively participate in the contest. Sabotage is often argued to be not only illegal, but also unethical and immoral and hence has a broad negative externality to people not actively participating in the competition. Preston and Szymanski (2003) argue that since most sports examine relative performance, sabotage may be an e¤ective way to outperform others, especially with a small number of players. However, even if sabotage reduces competitors'quality of performance and thus increases one's winning probability, it may also lower the attractiveness and productivity of the contest, thereby lowering one's expected return and leaving the overall e¤ect ambiguous. Balafoutas et al. (2012) show that sabotage indeed reduces the utility of spectators in a sports match. A survey of spectators in the Judo world championship shows that an increase in 'fouls'reduced the spectators'utility obtained from a Judo match.
This e¤ect is highly prominent in the case of electoral contests, in which it is possible for political parties to resort to counter-productive acts such as vote rigging, vote snatching, political violence etc. in order to gain power, or to prevent opponent voters from voting. In a political economy framework, Chaturvedi (2005) shows that the party with the lower level of political support will resort to more counter-productive acts. The general population and the voters, however, also su¤er from such acts.
In a similar vein, it can be hypothesized that, negative campaigning in market or in elections may reduce the utility of the consumers and the voters.
To date, there is no research study analyzing the e¤ects of negative product advertising on consumer welfare. However, there are both theoretical and empirical studies on the e¤ects of negative political campaigns on voters. Regarding the e¤ect of negative campaign on voter turnout, the demobilization hypothesis states that negative campaigns depress voter turnout whereas the stimulation hypothesis suggests that exposure to negative campaigns may even increase voters' probability of voting. The …eld results, however, are inconclusive.
It is shown by Soubeyran (2009) 
Policies to restrict sabotage
In the preceding sections, we established the occurrence and the consequences of sabotage. However, a clear understanding of the same allows one to design appropriate policies to overcome those issues. In this section, we address policies that economists have proposed as possible solutions to the problems related to sabotage. To fully understand these policies, it is helpful to take a closer look at the contestants' optimal sabotage activities. If we assume that there is an interior solution to the contestants'maximization problem and that the payo¤ functions are strictly concave, optimal sabotage activity s ij is characterized by the condition
which simply states that s ij is chosen such that the marginal bene…t to increasing s ij (in terms of a higher probability of receiving the winner prize) equals the marginal cost. Hence, policies that are aimed at tackling the sabotage problem a¤ect a contestant's decision by either reducing the marginal bene…t from sabotaging the opponents or, similar to the famous argument by Becker (1968) , by increasing the marginal cost. We also discuss other policies besides these two that may be implemented to restrict sabotage.
Policies that reduce the bene…ts from sabotage
Let us begin with policies that are aimed at reducing contestants' bene…t from sabotage. The most obvious policy in this respect, proposed by Lazear (1989) , is to decrease the di¤erence between winner and loser prizes. If this di¤erence is lowered, contestants have a lower incentive to win the contest. As a result, they are less willing to engage in costly sabotage. 11 Formally, with a decreasing prize spread, the left-hand-side (LHS) of condition (3) . Assuming c i to be strictly convex, this implies a decrease in s ij . By the same token, however, contestants are less willing to put forth productive e¤ort. Thus, the policy comes at a cost to the contest organizer. Because of this cost, 11 As shown by Chen (2003) , it is also conceivable that the level of sabotage does not depend on the prize spread at all. However, this happens only under very restrictive assumptions about production and cost functions. See Proposition 4 in his paper and the discussion thereafter. Drago and Turnbull (1991) propose not to organize a tournament at all if sabotage is a serious threat (i.e., to set the prize spread equal to zero) and to seek alternative ways to motivate the players to put forth productive e¤ort.
A similar argument has been put forward by Bose et al. (2010) . However, experimental results by Charness et al. (2013) suggest that sabotage may occur as long as information regarding the players' performance ranking is available, even if the monetary rewards do not depend on this ranking.
The predictions concerning the e¤ects of prize spread on players' decisions have found strong support from empirical and experimental studies.
Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2005), for example, analyze the e¤ects of increasing the number of points awarded for a win in Spanish football. They …nd that teams react by increasing both, the number of attackers and the number of defenders (while reducing the number of mid…elders) in the starting lineup. They interpret this observation not only as evidence of higher productive e¤orts (attackers), but also of higher sabotage (defenders) in response to the change in incentive structure. In line with the latter argument the authors also …nd that the number of fouls committed has increased after the change in the prize structure.
A similar analysis is conducted by Corral et al. (2010) with data from 1994-95 and 1995-96 seasons of Spanish First Division Football League. Again, the e¤ects of the change in the winning team's league points from two to three on sabotage activities are investigated. As the reward increases, Corral et al.
(2010) predict a rise in players'defensive e¤orts and thus a higher likelihood of a sending-o¤. They …nd that when reward points increase, teams in the winning position are more likely to sabotage and to have a player sent o¤ the pitch. Their results also suggest that when the goal di¤erence in a match becomes larger, the likelihood of a sending-o¤ is generally smaller.
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Laboratory experiments conducted to analyze the sabotage problem in contests con…rm the observation that sabotage levels increase in the prize spread (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2004 and Vandegrift and Yavas, 2010) . Contest organizers seem to understand the relationship between prize spread and sabotage levels. As a result, they increase prize spreads and prefer tournament schemes to other incentive devices more often if sabotage is not feasible (Falk et al., 2008; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011) .
A second method to reduce contestants'bene…t from sabotage is to increase the number of contestants. This possibility was …rst described by Konrad (2000) . The argument goes as follows: If a player increases his productive e¤ort, he increases his own output and thereby the probability of outperforming every single opponent. If, instead, he increases the level of sabotage directed against a particular rival, he decreases that rival's output and, hence, the probability of outperforming that rival only. If the number of contestants gets higher, productive e¤orts become relatively more attractive compared to sabotage activities, and the sabotage problem is mitigated.
Stated di¤erently, sabotage directed against player j by player i constitutes a public good among all other contestants. This is because player i increases all other players' (except j) winning-probabilities by sabotaging player j.
Based on the literature on public goods, it is a known fact that the provision 12 This implies that an increase in the ex-post e¢ ciency di¤erence reduces sabotage. This result is in line with the study by Brown and Chowdhury (2013) , who …nd less sabotage in horse racing when ex-ante e¢ ciency di¤erence is high. Overall, these studies suggest more sabotage between contestants with similar (ex-ante or ex-post) e¢ ciency.
of a public good decreases when more players participate in the good.
To present this argument formally, recall that in many situations it is assumed that contestant i receives the winner prize if and only if his performance is the highest among all contestants' performances so that p i = P (y i > max fy 1 ; :::; y i 1 ; y i+1 ; :::; y N g). When worker i chooses higher productive e¤ort (i.e., when he increases e i ), the term on the LHS of the inequality in parentheses increases, making it more likely that y i exceeds any of the y j (j = 1; :::; N; j 6 = i). Instead, when worker i decides to sabotage worker j more strongly (i.e. when he increases s ij ), y j is decreased and it becomes more likely that y i exceeds y j . The probability, with which y i exceeds any of the other contestants'performances, however, is not a¤ected. It immediately follows that the bene…t to increasing e i relative to increasing s ij gets higher, the higher the number of contestants competing for the prize. In spite of the importance of this theoretically robust argument, there is little evidence on the e¤ects of the number of contestants on sabotage activities. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) …nd that tournament size does not a¤ect sabotage levels. However, in their experiment, sabotage is directed not against a particular rival, but decreases the output of all opponents.
Obviously, the public-good problem outlined earlier disappears in such a setting.
Finally, Chen (2005) The reason is simple and related to the arguments concerning contest size.
By exerting productive e¤ort, an employee improves his chances of outperforming both internal and external candidates. Sabotage, however, can only be directed against internal competitors. Hence, if the …rm considers external candidates for promotion, internal competitors substitute productive e¤ort in place of sabotage. Formally, this argument could be substantiated by assuming p i as p i = P (y i > max fy 1 ; :::; y i 1 ; y i+1 ; :::; y N ; yg), where y denotes a …xed performance level that cannot be in ‡uenced by the contestants.
Policies that increase the cost of sabotage
The most obvious policy to increase the ( Several other policies that aim at increasing the cost of sabotage have been discussed in the literature. Lazear (1989) proposes to spatially separate contestants in order to make it more di¢ cult for them to sabotage each other. Consider the example of a …rm that organizes a contest to motivate the employees. Employees from di¤erent locations …nd it harder to a¤ect their opponents'performances than employees working in the same building or o¢ ce.
When the contest organizer is able to a¤ect the …eld of contestants, he may choose to let only those players participate in the contest for whom sabotaging others is relatively costly. Players may incur some form of psychological cost while sabotaging others and this cost may vary across players.
Similarly, players who su¤er from relative deprivation or envy when being worse o¤ than others have a lower cost of sabotage since sabotage decreases the probability of feeling deprived or envious (Kräkel, 2000; Grund and Sliwka, 2005 ). The contest organizer should thus admit only those players who do not su¤er from relative deprivation or envy. Unfortunately, it is often dif-…cult to observe the speci…c characteristics of a player. Furthermore, players do not have an incentive to self-select into contests that are designed for their types (Lazear, 1989) . Mechanisms such as assessment centers may help to screen contestants, but these mechanisms are far from being perfect.
A …eld study on the e¤ects of cost on sabotage is provided by Balafoutas et al. (2012) . They use data from two consecutive Judo World Champi- Laboratory experiments have found that contestants retaliate when being sabotaged, and that the threat of retaliation deters players from sabotaging others in the …rst place (Harbring et al., 2007; Vandegrift and Yavas, 2010) .
Retaliation thus acts as a kind of indirect additional cost of sabotage. Obviously, players must learn the identity of saboteurs in order to be able to retaliate upon them. The contest should therefore be transparent in the sense that decisions should be publicly observable. Moreover, players should meet each other more than once in order to be able to retaliate. Retaliation, however, may not just bene…t the contest organizer; it may also be used against him. If he treats the contestants badly, they may decide to sabotage each other in order to reduce the output that the contest organizer receives. This kind of behavior is observed by Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005) . They …nd that sabotage levels are higher if the organizer himself sets low tournament prizes rather than these low prizes being exogenously given. Presumably, the psychological costs of sabotaging others are higher if the contestants have been treated well by the contest organizer than if they have not. An immediate consequence is that the organizer should be generous towards the contestants in order to prevent them from engaging in sabotage. Finally, experimental results from Bolle et al. (2013) show that if retaliation itself can be retaliated, then players might be engaged only in destructive behavior;
i.e., retaliation against a saboteur might escalate the execution of destructive e¤orts spirally over time, and lead to the worst possible outcome. Hence, the designer will need to be very careful about allowing retaliatory actions.
The contest organizer may instead wish to a¤ect the timing of decisions. Kräkel (2005) considers a model in which players decide to help or sabotage each other …rst and, after having observed these decisions, choose their productive e¤orts. He shows that a contestant may even want to help his opponent to make subsequent competition less equal and thus less intense.
In other words, sabotaging the opponent would yield a close competition in productive e¤orts and, accordingly, high cost of productive e¤ort. To lower this cost, players may abstain from sabotaging the opponent. Of course, the reduction in sabotage comes at a cost to the contest organizer since, contrary to the contestants, he su¤ers from the decrease in productive e¤orts.
Other policies
There are policies to restrict sabotage that do not fall in either of the two categories described above. Brown and Chiang (2008) , for instance, consider the tournament setting of Lazear (1989) and allow the players to form coalitions.
It is assumed that there exist externalities, because of which a coalition's probability of winning depends on its size. If externalities are su¢ ciently high, an equilibrium subcoalition exists and overall sabotage goes down. For a su¢ ciently small externality, a grand coalition exists and sabotage does not occur at all. Understandably, this type of policy may be feasible only for some speci…c situations and not for sports or workplace environments.
Given previous studies on sabotage, however, the most important policy may be the adoption of a restrictive information policy. argue that many of the outlined problems rely on the possibility of players observing each others'talents or previous performances. Hence, the contest organizer should try to keep this kind of information secret. If, for instance, the organizer does not reveal intermediate performance information
to the contestants in a dynamic contest, they do not know which player has a lead and cannot direct their sabotage at this particular player. As a result, incentives to put forth productive e¤ort in early rounds of the contest are reinstalled. Using experimental data, …nd that this kind of restrictive information policy works in the sense that productive e¤orts in early rounds of dynamic contests increase. As shown by Charness et al. (2013) , such a policy may not only lower sabotage per se, it may also solve the additional problem of discouragement of productive e¤ort . Another way is to introduce new contestants with unknown ability.
As Chen (2003) argues, including contestants from outside of an organization may reduce the likelihood of sabotage.
Another possibility to tackle the problems described earlier is to change the prize structure. Suppose that there is a single loser prize, but N 1 winner prizes. Then p i is given by p i = P (y i > min fy 1 ; :::; y i 1 ; y i+1 ; :::; y N g), and the contestants prefer to sabotage players of low ability to make sure not to end up in the last position (Yumoto 2003) . Obviously, very able contestants are willing to participate in such a contest. Moreover, in dynamic contests, players have an incentive to exert high productive e¤ort in early stages to avoid lagging behind and being sabotaged harshly.
Conclusion
Sabotage is the exertion of destructive e¤ort towards rivals with the intention of reducing their likelihood of winning a contest. Although sabotage is observed in various day to day situations such as sports, promotion, war, rent-seeking etc., and there is a sizeable body of literature on this topic, there is no existing e¤ort to review the literature yet. In this article, we review the economics literature of the act of sabotage in contests.
Both theoretical and applied studies agree on several points regarding sabotage. Sabotage is positively related with the prize value to be won and negatively with the cost related to the sabotage act. Usually, more e¢ cient agents are a¤ected more severely by a saboteur. There are instances in which collective sabotage acts may o¤set the gains from the productive acts. This is because sabotage not only has the direct e¤ect of damaging welfare, but also indirect e¤ects of dis-incentivizing players from exerting productive e¤ort, and negative externality to third parties. There are several ways to restrict sabotage acts, viz. to increase the cost of sabotage, concealing information regarding e¢ ciency or performance, increasing the number of participants, keeping the contest asymmetric etc.
As indicated earlier, sabotage has been extensively studied in the context of promotional tournaments. Sabotage may be relevant even if …rms do not use tournaments. In some situations, …rms …nd it in their interest to o¤er wage contracts to their employees that depend on the employees' relative performances. Such wage contract may, for instance, be optimal if individual performances are positively correlated and employees are risk-averse so that relative performance evaluation (RPE) reduces the income risk that employees face (Holmström and Milgrom, 1990) . If an employee's wage depends on his performance relative to that of others, the incentive structure is similar to that in a tournament so that sabotage is obviously an issue. Even if workers collaborate in teams, sabotage may occur. it is very important to observe the theory through the lens of behavioral economists (for an example see Mui, 1995) . Finally, to date, there exist no …eld experiment on sabotage. Hence, there is a broad scope of extending the literature in this area.
